T HE limits of a ruler's power and the right of resistance by subjects to such power when illicitly used were commonly discussed by medieval thinkers. By the thirteenth century both issues figured prominently in treatments of the state and were, for example, discussed by such representative thinkers as Henry Bracton and Thomas Aquinas. Bracton argued that a community had the right to resist a ruler whose actions seriously harmed its well-being.' Similarly Aquinas asserted that the subjects of a ruler could legitimately resist those commands which violated divine or natural law. Moreover, Aquinas added, as a last resort such a ruler could be deposed by the community.! This right of
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! D~legibus~l consuetudinibus angiia«, ed. G. E. Woodbine, S (New Haven, 1940),43, fol. 171b: ''Si aurern princeps vel rex vel alius qui superiorern non habuerit, nisi deum, contra ipsum non habebitur remedium per assisam, immo tantum locus erit supplicationi ut factum suum corrigat et emendat, quod si non fecerit, sufficiat ei pro poena quod deum expectet ultorem .., nisi sit qui dicat quod universitas regni et baronagium suum hoc facere possit et debeat in curia ipsius regis." In his See, for example. p. 27: "If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, becoming a tyrant. he abuses the royal power." resistance by the community to the unjust exercise of a ruler's authority was also recognized in discussions of church government. Many canonists writing before Bracton and Aquinas taught that a Genaral Council could depose a pope for heresy or other serious crimes.' These ideas did not develop in isolation from the political realities of medieval life. In the thirteenth century some English barons disobeyed commands of two kings which they considered unlawful and they would depose a third monarch in the following century. Similarly Bishop Robert Grosseteste refused to obey a conunand of Pope Innocent IV! Moreover, such diverse opponents of the papacy as the Emperor Frederick 11, the Colonna Cardinals, and the supporters of King Philip IV of France wished to see General Councils convened to depose reigning popes. ' Such theories were intricately linked to medieval beliefs about the relationship between the ruler and the law. Everyone agreed, of course, that the ruler was bound by the universal' conunands of divine or natural law. The question at issue was the ruler's relationship to the fundamental law of the particular society over which he governed. The more common view was that the ruler had an obligation to observe such laws although he could not be coerced to do so. Hence Bracton wrote that ''The king should be under no man but under God and under the law". 6 Similarly Aquinas held that the prince was subject to the directive force of the law if not to its coercive force.' By the thirteenth century, however, jurists and theologians began to teach that in extraordinary circumstances it might be necessary for a ruler to act outside the framework of existing law to defend the welfare of the entire community. These writers thus conceived of the ruler as above the law in some ways but below it in others. Medieval thinkers were, in fact, beginning to wrestle with the problem of sovereignty and they expressed themselves in different ways. For example, the Roman Law adage "Necessity knows no law" was now commonly employed by medieval thinkers to describe the extensive powers of a ruler to act extralegally for the community's good." Similarly canonists began to claim that the pope could act outside the ordinary course of church law by his' plenitude of power for the church's good, although he could not act in opposition to the general state or well-being of the church,"
The historian Ernst Kantorowicz called attention to a phrase in the Sicilian Constitutions (1231) of Frederick 11 describing the ruler as "Father and Son of Justice."lo Such an expression accurately reflected the more common medieval view of a ruler's power. Again, Charles McIlwain believed he found a distinction between gubernaculum and iurisdiaio, that is between those powers exercised by a ruler outside the existing legal framework and those powers exercised within it, in medieval discussions of the English king's power. Although Mcllwain the directive force of the law the prince is subject to the law by his own will as it is said in Extra, De constitutionibus, cap. cum omnes iDecretales 1.11.6), 'Whatever anyone has established as law for another, he should adhere to himself ... ' and in the Code .
•. ' It is a declaration worthy of the ruler for the prince to profess himself bound by the laws ...., The prince is also above the law, in that, if it is expedient, he can change the law, or dispense from it according to time and place." Summa theologiae I-li, 96, 5 Resp., trans. Tiemey, "Bracton", p. 304. 10 The King's Two Bodies, pp. 98-99: "Not without great counsel and wise deliberation have the QlIirites by the lex regia conferred on the Roman Prince both the right to legislate and the impenum, that from the very same person (ruling ... over the people by his Power) there might progress the origin of justice, from whom also the defence of justice proceeds. Provision, therefore, was made for reasons of utility and necessity, as can be proved, that there concur in the selfsame person the origin as well as the protection of justice, lest Vigor be failing justice, and justice, Vigor. The Caesar, therefore, must be at once the Father and Son of Justice, her Lord and her Minister: Father and Lord in creating Justice and protecting what has been created; and in like fashion he shall be, in her veneration, the Son of justice and protecting what has been created; and in like fashion he shall be, in her veneration, the Son of Justice and, in ministering her plenty, her minister." overemphasized the absolutism of the royal gubernaculum." he was correct in ascribing a medieval origin to the idea that a ruler did possess in emergencies the power to act outside the ordinary course of positive law for the community's welfare."
One particularly important way of expressing this common doctrine was to distinguish between the absolute power and the ordained power' (or ordinary power) of a ruler. This terminology was borrowed from those medieval theologians who likewise distinguished between the absolute and the ordained powers of God.
1S
In a recent article Francis Oakley demonstrated the importance this distinction as applied both to the pope and the prince played in the formulation of medieval and Renaissance political thought." For example, the Attorney General for Ireland in King James I's reign stated:
The King hirnself was pleased to limit and stint his absolute power, and to rye himself to the ordinary rules of Law ... [but we should not forget that he continues to] ... exercise a double power, viz. an absolute power, or Merum Imperium, when he doth use Prerogatives onely , which is not bound by positive law; and an ordinary power of Jurisdiction, which doth cooperate with the law."
Similarly Jean Bodin's assertion that the prince was able to derogate from the ordinary right by his absolute power, though not from the laws of nature, was representative of many royalist theories in sixteenth-century France: ' Although Oakley noted that the distinction between absolute and ordained powers was employed by fifteenth-century Gallican writers in 11 their defense of the liberties of the French Church;' he did not realize that these terms were also to be found in the wri rings of the latethirteenth-century founders of that Callican tradition, the secular masters of theology of the University of Paris." Indeed, the first theologian to apply the distinction between absolute and ordained powers to the pope seems to have been the thirteenth-century Parisian master Henry of Chent (d. 1293). 19 Henry's role in the struggle of the secular masters of the University of Paris in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries against the friars' papal privileges, which provided the major impetus for early medieval Callicanism, has long been recognized." However, his unique and iteresting treatment of the absolute and ordained powers of the pope and the circumstances in which papal decrees were to be disobeyed has been almost completely neglected because Henry's discussion is contained in a still unprinted tract of his which survives in only one manuscript." We have, therefore, transcribed the appropriate section of Henry's discussion at the end of this article. Henry of Ghent's pamphlet against the friars, written in the winter of 1288/89,22 dealt mainly with an earlier papal privilege to the friars and deserves attention for several reasons. We have already mentioned that Henry of Ghent seems to have been the first theologian to apply the distinction between absolute and ordained powers to the pope. He was also the first opponent of the papal grants to the friars to resurrect the older canonistic teaching that a General Council could depose a pope who harmed the church."
The starting point for Henry's discussion of papal power in this treatise was the recent papal privilege to the friars Ad fructus uberes" In 1281 Pope Martin IV promulgated this decree with the intention of ending the quarrel between the seculars and mendicants over the friars' ministry." The bull's most controversial provision commanded the mendicants to remind their penitents to observe the older Conciliar statute (1215) which obliged all Christians to confess all their sins at least once a year to their parish priests." Mendicant theologians immediately argued that Pope Martin had not intended that sins confessed to friars were to be confessed again to parish priests. Rather, they contended, the pope had merely enjoined individuals to confess to their curates sins not confessed to the friars. Thus the friars' interpretation of Ad fructus uberes would have meant that most penitents would never confess all their sins to their parish priests. The secular masters, among them Henry of Ghent, retorted that the pope must have intended penitents to confess all their sins of the past year to their parish priests, including those previously confessed to friars. For, they argued, by the mendicant interpretation Martin IV would have withdrawn parishoners from the jurisdiction of their bishops and curates. Such an act, they contended, would have subverted the church's divine structure since the jurisdiction of prelates came from Christ and not the pope."
In the years immediately after the appearance of Ad [rurtus uberes, the papacy remained silent on this question although pressed to issue an authoritative interpretation of that bull. However, with the election or a new pope, Nicholas IV, early in 1288, it seemed as if a papal decision might be forthcoming and, since Nicholas was himself a friar, that this decision would be in the friars' favor."
The reaction of some anti-mendicant French bishops, to the crisis caused by Nicholas IV's election was to affirm that the Conciliar decree Omnis, which contained the obligation of annual confession to curates, was part of divine law which the pope could not infringe in any way."
Apparently, these French bishops hoped in this manner to convince the new pope that he ought not to interpret Ad fructus uberes in such a way as to remove the obligation of yearly confession to the parish priest.
Henry of Ghent could not, however, adopt so extreme a position. First of all, he had publicly and clearly stated in his earlier analysis in 1282 of the meaning of Ad fructus uberes that the provision embodied in 27 For the various details of the quarrel between the seculars and the mendicants during the 128os, stimulated by the papal privilege to the friars of 1281, Ad frurtus uberes, see the following studies: G. Post, "A Petition relating to the Bull Ad Fructus Uberes" Speculum, 11 (1936) , 231'37; P. Glorieux, Prelats francals conrre religieux mendiants: autour de la bulle 'Ad fructus uberes' (1281-1290)," P. Gratien, "Ordres mendiams et clerge seculier a la fin du Xllle Omnis was not part of divine law and that it could licitly be changed by the pope." Moreover, Henry may have been aware of a danger in the bishops' position which they themselves did not sufficiently appreciate. If Pope Nicholas IV were, in fact, to ignore the warning of the Fench bishops and endorse the friars' interpretation of Ad fructus uberes, then these bishops would have been placed in the dangerous position of asserting that a reigning pope had, in fact, violated divine law and thus fallen into heresy. Heure Henry of Ghent was placed in a most awkward position at the end of 1288 when he came to treat again the question of the correct meaning of Ar! frill/m uberes, As the most prominent defender of the position of the secular theologians at the University of Paris he could not remain silent in the debate to influence the new pope." However, the strongest argument of the anti-mendicant coalition of Parisian secular masters and French bishops had been that the privilege of Martin IV, as interpreted by the friars in their writings, could not be granted lawfully by the pope since it violated the fundamental divine strucgo "Ad hoc dicendum prirno quo ad potestatem infringendi stannum (Omnil utriusque .ltX1L11 per conunissionem in hoc scilicet quod confessi illis [fratribus] quibus facta est commissio, non teneantur proprio sacerdoti parochiali irerum confiteri, quin enim papa quo ad hoc ipsum possit inIringere. non est dubium .... Q).tamvis enim aliquibus videatur, si talis potestas universaliter concederetur fratribus utriusque ordinis, quod hoc esset ecclesiasticum ordinem pervertere et indirecte usum c1avium a praelatis subtrahere et populum ab eorum obedientia et iurisdictione retrahere et quod hoc esset variare ilIud quod ordinatum est generalher ad perpetuam ecdesiae universalis urilitarem, contra iIIud [distincrione] XXV, q. I, Q¥e ad perpetuam etc., ubi dicitur quod 'Papa non potest contra generale ecclesiae starururn nee contra articulos fidei sed contra statuturn ecclesiae quod non est ita generale bene potest dispensare,' Tamen non est dubium quin dictum statutum IS ture of the church. But Henry of Ghent could not say this now, at least prudently, since there was a real possibili ty that the new pope would endorse the friars' interpretation. Thus Henry wished to insinuate that the mendicant view violated the church's fundamental laws without, however, saying that the pope absolutely could not rule in favor of the mendicants.
In his discussion of 1288, therefore, Henry of Ghent was forced by circumstances to come to grips with the constitutional dilemma which had long been implicit in the protest of the Parisian secular masters against the pro-mendicant policy of several thirteenth-century popes. What was the intrinsic nature and limits of a ruler's sovereignty? How far was a ruler bound by the essential constitutional structure of the society he governed? How far did the immorality of a ruler's act invalidate its legality? These issues were only to be sharply perceived by the secular master Henry of Ghent at the end of 1288.
Henry began his discussion by distinguishing among three different types of a ruler's decrees. A first type included those acts which directly contradicted divine or natural law; for example, a ruler's command which directly harmed the welfare of his subjects. Henry called such decrees sinful and invalid and, in addition, asserted that commands of this kind were to be resisted by the community. As an example of this first type, Henry cited the case of a ruler who commanded a sword to be returned to a madman. Such an act, according to Henry of Ghcnt, was directly evil."
A second type of decree did not in itself contradict divine or natural law but could have this effect in certain circumstances. Henry labelled such commands as unjust and sinful, but they were not grounds [or a rulers deposition. They were within the ruler's pOWCl' and thus valid. although sinful and unjust. As an instance Henry mentioned the case of a ruler who ordered a madman's sword returned to his brother. This decree would result in evil only in circumstances where the brother 851 According to Henry of Ghent, the ruler who thus mistakenly followed the universal moral imperative to return goods to their owners by giving bad the sword to the madman, thereby harmed natural or divine läw by seriously injuring his subjects' welfare. Referring his audience to Aristotle's discussion of this topic in his Nicomachean Ethics, 1137b, Henry wrote: "Legislator non potest concedere privilegium aut condere statutum ad quod sequitur in ecclesia subtractio debite reverentie et obedientie inferiorum ad suos superiores aut universaliter destructio ordinis ecclesiastici, quia hoc est magnum inconveniens et contra ius naturale et divinum, contra quod legislator nichil statuere potest aut concedere aut dispensare; puta quod furioso reddendus sit gladius, existente actu in furia, quem deposuit, Si enim legislatori statuenti generaliter quod gladius deponenti reddendus est talis casus occurreret, ipsum legis director excipiendurn a statuto generali iudicaret secundum veridicam doctrinam philosophi, V Ethicorum" B.N. 311IO,fol. 139rb. could be expected to hand over the sword to the madman." Finally the third category of decrees included all those orders which did not harm subjects under any circumstances."
Although at one point in his discussion, Henry of Chent seems to have considered the possibility that a pope who endorsed the mendicant interpretation of Ad fructus uberes would directly contradict divine or natural law and thus merit deposition, this remark was out of character with the whole tenor of Henry's reasoning." For elsewhere in his discussion, Henry flatly stated that he would restrict himself to a consideration of whether such a papal endorsement of the friars' views belonged to the second or third category of a ruler's acts, that is acts which were unjust and sinful, although to be obeyed by the subjects, or ans which were both just and licit." Henry thereby protected himself against the contingency that Pope Nicholas IV would, in fact, sanction the friars' interpretation. Henry's refusal to seriously consider whether such a papal an belonged to the first category of a ruler's decrees was characteristic of the conservative attitude of most of the thirteenth-and fourteenth-century secular theologians who opposed the mendicant privileges. In the last resort, none of the men who objected to the manner in which the papal plenitude of power was exercised on the friars' behalf would ever agrue that this furnished grounds for the deposition of the pope." It was at this point in his discussion that Henry introduced the distinction between absolute and ordained powers." 33 "Secundum autern modo bene quandoque sequitur inconveniens in statuto vel privilegio existente in se iusto et equo, saltern in casu, verbi gratia, si starueretur quod gladius depositus a furioso redderetur fratri suo sano, Ex hoc enim non sequeretur inconveniens dictum nisi ex prava dispositione occulta huiusmodi sane, qua gladium sibi reddirum vellet tradere furioso ut vel se vel alium occideret." BN. 3120, fol. I 39va.
34 Although Henry of Ghent did not explicitly refer to this third type of decree at the outset of his discussion, he did, as we shall see, assume its existence, that is, of decrees promulgated by a ruler's ordained power which were neither unjust nor illicit. 36 "Statutum autem vel privilegium ad quod secundo modo sequitur inconveniens dictum, scilicet substractio debite reveremie etc., an hoc'posset statuere aut concede re legislator. super hoc distinguendum, puto, de potentia absoluta et ordinata." BoN. 3120. fol. 139va. ''Dico ergo de legislatore, qui est homo purus potens peccare et malum agere, quod de potentia absoluta bene potest statuere vel privilegium concede re ad quod sequitur secundo modo inconveniens predictum, Et hoc ideo quid in antecenderue non statim apparet inconveniens, cuiusmodi, ut puto, est privilegium fratrum secundum eorum intelleeturn ...." Fol. 139Vbo 37 For instance, the secular master of theology William of Saint Amour, writing against the papal privileges 10 the mendicants in the 12505 and 12605, consistently minimised the meaning of Henry of Ghent defined absolute power as power used sinfully but validly. Thus unlike other theologians Henry refused to credit God with an absolute power by which he could perform acts that could not be done by his ordained power, since this implied that God could act unjustly." However, this distinction, Henry claimed, was apposite in the these papal grants. See, for example, a typical assertion by William cited by Congar, "Aspects", p. 38 In addition to the text printed at the end of this article, Henry of Ghent referred to the absolute and ordained powers of rulers in another work, Quodlibet XIV, q. 8. In this discussion he also equated absolute power with power sinfully and unjustly used, although licit. Here, for example, Henry argued that a ruler could levy taxes by his potentia iuris and not by his absolute power. He concluded this argument by stating: "Sed bene debent cavere sibi superiores quod nihil talium staruant aut exigant quin saltern evidens sit ipsis quod sit ad communem utilitatem seu publicam, non tarnen ad privatam et ponant statuta et edicta tarn rationabili a ut procedant ab ipsis non de potentia facti sed iuris, nee de potentia absoluta sed de potentia relata, pensa rationis non errante. Nec video in hoc circa clericos aut laicos respectu suorum superiorum aliquam esse difTerentiam, licet prelati dericorum eo quod nullum haereditarium ius habent in suis dignitatibus sicut prineipes, facilius possunt deponi quam principes, et laici, nullo statuto superioris constricti,liberiorem dispostionem de bonis suis habent quam clerici, eo quod bona clericorurn, communicanda sunt pauperibus ultra id quod in proprios usus assumunt sicut aliqui de numero pauperum prout alias satis exposui." I Quodlibtta, fol. 568r.
39 "Stannum aurem vel privilegium ad quod secundo modo sequitur inconveniens dictum, scilicet substractio debite reverentie etc., an hoc posset statuere aut concedere legislator, super hoc distinguendum, puto, de potentia absoluta et ordinata. Licet enim circa Deum non contingat distinguere inter potentiam absolutam et ordinatum; Deus enim, eo quod peccare non potest, nichil potest de potentia absoluta nisi ilIud possit de potentia ordinata. Omnis enim potentia sua quocumque modo vadit in actum ordinata <est>. ''BN. 3120, 101. 139va. Henry of Ghent also rejected the distinction between absolute and ordained powers as commonly applied by contemporary theologians to God's powers. See, for example, Henry's statements in his Quodlibet 11, q.
11. For those thirteenth-and fourteenth-century theologians who did apply these terms to God's powers, see the list compiled by Oakley," Jacobean Political Theology," p. 334, on. 55-56. To
Oakley's list can be added Alexander of HaIes, Alexandri de Hales summa theologica, ed. B. Klumper , 1 (Q:ltaracchi, 19114), 1107. However, not all the theologians in this period accepted this distinction as applied to God's powers. For example, Bonaventure seems to have rejected this distinction at one point in his career, Sancti Bonauetuurae opera omnia, ed. studio et cura patrum collegii Sancti Bonaventurae, 1 (<zyaracchi, 1883), 2, 778. Those theologians who did employ the terms absolute and ordained powers in their consideration of God's powers usually mentioned the example of case of human legislators such as the pope who could act sinfully." Henry even went so far as to identify the pope's absolute power with his plenitude of power." Hem)' thus argued that the pope certainly could abolish the need for reiterated confessions by his absolute power without, however, insisting that this could only be done by his absolute power. He suggested that although such a measure did not go counter to divine or natural law by its very nature, it could seriously subvert the church's divine structure under certain circumstances. FOI' example, Henry asserted, in the early church such a privilege would have beeil beneficial because of the shortage of clergy and the obedience of subjeers to their bishops and parish priests. However, under present conditions, Henry seemed to say. this measure would only aggravate the already widespread disobedience of subjects to their secular clergy." 41 "Et sic dico quod pa'''' de potentia absoluta potest tale privilegium fratribus cOII("ederequia ad ipsum ex natura talis privilegii sive per se non sequeretur dictum inconvenil·ns. (ö1ia non sequeretur si homines in tali statu essent in quali erant ab initio homines prilnitive ecclesie in qua erant communes sacerdotes. (ö1i tunc congruebant propter magnam sarerdotum et IXlpuli devotionem quando sacerdotes non querebant circa populum que sua erant sed quod Ihesu Christi, nee, e converso, populus contra sacerdotem. Sed tunc quando refregescit caritas eorum muhorulll et habundat iniquitas, tale ineonveniens de facili sequeretur et sic per accidens, scilicet el( prava sacerdotum dispositione et populi et eorum indevotione. Unde dico quod papa posset de potentia eius absoluta modo tale privilegium fratribus concedere, et quod plus est, puto quod pOS.'il"1 e("-c1esiam modernam ad statum pri.nitivum in quo regebatur de communi sa('erdotum consilio reducere. Hoe tamen salvo quod essent semper episcopi sicut tunc erant apostoli superioJ"l-Saliis in ecclesia et similiter curati sicut tune erant discipuli. (ö1od enim omnino non essent epis(:opi nee parrochiales sacerdotes in ecclesia loco apostolorum et discipulorum, ut duo ordines instituti a Christo in ecclesia omnino demolirentur, magnum inconveniens esset. Et an aliquis homo purus hec poterit facere, ipse dominus papa viderit el iudicet;" BN. 3120, fols. Igqvb·14ora.
ruler's absolute power which was to be regularly employed by medieval and Renaissance thinkers." Henry's unique use of this distinction reflected his fundamental constitutional conservatism, for he undoubtedly was familiar with earlier canonistic uses of these terms.' The ruler, according to Henry, could not, apparently, justly employ an absolute, extralegal power for the community's good since he regarded such acts as inherently evil. The ruler could, nevertheless, validly employ such power although it was wrong." Henry's conclusion that a pope or a secular ruler possessed such a sinful, but legitimate absolute power was unlikely to be adopted by later thinkers. For Henry's political theory was impractical now that it was obvious that the assumption of extralegal powers by thirteenth-century monarchs would really benefit rather than harm their communities.
Finally, although Henry of Ghent's brief suggestion that a pope who adopted a pro-mendicant interpretation of Ad fructus uberes merited deposition made him the first anti-mendicant medieval theologian to clearly suggest a Conciliar solution to the secular-mendicant conflict, monk: "Alii dicunt, quod licet voturn sit de substantia monachatus, tarnen hoc potest de plenitudine potestatis, quod non de potestate ordinata sed de absoluta, secundum quam potest mutare substantiam rei ..." Hostiensis himself adopted the distinction between absolute and ordained powers elsewhere in his commentary on the Decretals (5·31.8, fol. 72V).He asked whether the pope could both suppress and unite monasteries in a diocese without first consulting the local bishop: ..... Papa potest facere sine consilio ecclesiarum .... Sed nee Papa haec, vel alios casus sibi specialirer reservatus ... consuevit expedire sine consilio fratrum, id est Cardinalium, nee istud potest Iarere de potestate ordinaria ... licet secus de absoluta ...."
46 Oakley, 'lacobean Political Theology," pp. 523-37. 47 Henry explicitly cited Hostiensis at one point in his discussion: "Et hoc ideo quid in antecedente non statim apparet inconveniens, cuiusmodi, ut puto, est privilegium Fratrum secundum eorum inrellectum, dicente Ostiense : Si qui/wet POJJet sibi confessorem etigere t't rum oporteret rum habere amfessorem deurminatum, hoc t'URt ecdesiis nimiJ iniurimum et contingeret inde disrumpi uinculum ecdesiauice disapline et quamlibet~acephalumi" B.N. 3120, fol. 139Vb.
48 Some kind of emergency absolute power seems to have been presupposed by those writers in the earlier part of the thirteenth century who asserted that the pope or the prince could, in cases of extreme necessity of the community, aCI outside the ordinary course of law, even though these writers do not seem to have actually employed the terms absolute and ordained powers. In fact, an earlier anti-mendicant thinker at Paris, Gerard of Abbeville, seemed to credit the pope with such emergency powers in his quodlibetal discussion of about 1265. Inquiring whether the pope could dispense a nun from her vows 10 marry a Moslem emperor for the good of the entire church, Gerard responded:" Potest ergo papa dispensare cum tali coniugio de plentiudine potestatis et earn absolvere a voto et ab habitu, presertim unde eminet universalis ecclesie maxima utilitas et urgens ac evidens posrulat necessitas ... quia publica utilitas preferenda est private .... Non ergo bene intelligunt regulas ecclesiasticas, qui hoc negant causa necessitatis vel utilitatis fieri posse, quociens communis necessitatis vel utilitatis fieri posse, quociens communis necessitas aut utilitas persuaserit," Cited in Post, Studies, p. lI68. For Gerard of Abbeville's doctrines, see the following studies: Schleyer, Anfinge; Congar, "Aspects",; P. Glorieux, "Pour une edition de Gerard d'Abbeville," Rediercha de tJrioIogie ancimne et mLdirvak, 19 !19~7), 56-84· Henry's radicalism should not be overstressed. For it should also be remembered that Henry's cautious and conservative nature precluded him from leaving his audience with the impression that he himself favored such a solution. The passage in which he expressed this view was only a brief aside. Moreover, elsewhere he explicitly admitted that the pope could abolish annual confession to the parish priest without violating divine law and so meriting deposition. Writing during the winter of 1288/8g when it appeared that the new pope, Nicholas IV, would end the secular-mendicant quarrel by endorsing the friars' interpretation of Ad fructus uberes, Henry of Ghent deployed an entirely new argument. By insisting that the canon Omnis was part of divine law and thus totally outside papal jurisdiction, some French bishops had merely utilized a line of argument already common to medieval thinkers. Henry rejected their view and, in fact, the main thrust of his argument lay elsewhere. His attempt to mark off an area of papal action, that area pertaining to the pope's absolute power which, although it did not violate divine law was, nevertheless, sinful because it harmed the community's well-being by violating its fundamental laws, was much more forward-looking and novel than the bishops' position. It is true that Henry did not quite go so far as to assert that the pope could be deposed for actions of this kind. Nevertheless, his argument was moving in the direction of subjecting the pope to certain fundamental laws of the community he governed.
The hesitancies in Henry of Ghent's argument should be stressed because, in the last resort, Henry, like the other thirteenth-and fourteenth-century anti-mendicant secular theologians, never called for the deposition of a pope who had favored the friars. Despite his bitter disagreement with decades of pro-mendicant papal policy, Henry of Ghent never did challenge papal headship of the church. This was in sharp contrast to the early-fourteenth-century thinker Marsilius of Padua who, also doubting the wisdom of papal policy, was led to question the very institution of the papacy. At a council held at Paris in 1290, Pope Nicholas IV announced through cardinal-legates that the friars' interpretation of Ad fructus uberes was correct and also that the secular theologians were to cease their discussions on this subject." Henry of Ghent, characteristically, did not call for the convocation of a Genaral Council to depose Nicholas IV nor did he attack the pope's position as head of the church. Instead, he protested the novel papal ban on discussion for which he was immediately suspended from teaching by one of the legates. Henry thereupon submitted to the papal decision, retired from academic life, and died three years later .50 Searsdale, N.Y. <D >ecima ratio talis erat. Legislator non potest concedere privilegium aut condere statutum ad quod sequitur in ecclesia subtractio debite reverentie et obedientie inferiorum ad suos superiores aut universaliter destructio ordinis ecclesiastici, quia hoc est magnum inconveniens et contra ius naturale et divinum, contra quod legislator nichil statuere potest aut concedere aut dispensare; puta quod furioso reddendus sit gladius, existente actu in furia, quem deposuit. Si enim legislatori statuenti generaliter quod gladius deponenti' reddendus est talis casus occurreret, ipsum legis director excipiendum a statuto generali iudicaret secundum veridicam doctrinam philosophi, V Ethionum? Sed secundum intelleeturn fratrum, ut dicunt prelati, ad privilcgiorum ipsorum concessionem sequitur in ecclesia subrractio debite reverentie. Ergo etc. Ergo legislator, ut papa, tale privilegium secundum intellectum et voluntatem fratrum non porest concedere. Consequens falsum est, ergo et antecedens, Consequentis falsitas pater quia tale privilegium concedendo non concedit papa nisi quod suum est cum ipse sit omnium curatus immediatus.
Din> quod maior propositio que videtur Iacere pro Iratribus disringuenda est, quia ex aliquo, puta ex statuto vel privilegio, inconveniens aliquando sequitur dupliciter; uno modo per se et ex natura statuti aut privilegii sed ex alio exlinltrinsecus (139rb/139v) subveniente. Primo quidem modo inconveniens non sequitur ex statuto aut privilegio nisi ipsum statutum aut privilegium in se sit inconveniens et contra divinum ius et naturam,' verbi gratia, si statui turf quod gladius depositus a furioso in omnem eventurn esset reddendus et ipsi existenti in furia; sequeretur enim ex hoc per se quod seipsum occideret, scilicet in hora furie, vel alium.
Secundum autem modo bene quandoque sequitur inconveniens in statuto vel privilegio existente in se iusto et equo, saltem in casu, verbi gratia, si statueretur quod gladius depositus a furioso redderetur fratri I MS: deponendi. suo sano. Ex hoc enim non sequeretur inconveniens dictum mSI ex prava dispositione occulta huiusmodi sane, qua gladium sibi redditum veIlet tradere furioso ut vel se vel alium occideret.
Dico ergo quod statutum vel privilegium ad quod primo modo sequitur inconveniens dictum, scilicet' substractio debite reverentie etc., non potest concedere legislator quicumque fuerit ille quia esset contra ordinem nature et divine iusticie, ut dictum est in probatione dine maioris propositionis. Vel dicendum esset sic statuenti aut privilegium concedenti" quod dicit Paulus apostolus, Gal Statutum autern vel privilegium ad quod secundo modo sequitur inconveniens dictum, scilicet substractio debite reverentie etc, an hoc posset statuere aut concedere legislator, super hoc distinguendum, puto, de potentia" absoluta et ordinata. Licet enim circa Deum non contingat distinguere inter potentiam absolutam et ordinatam; Deus enim, eo quod peccare" non potest, nichil potest de potentia" absoluta nisi illud possit de potentia ordinata. Omnis enirn potentia" sua quocumque modo vadit in actum ordinata <est >. 
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Circa hominem tarnen purum bene contingit distinguere inter potentiam" absolutam et ordinatam, Homo enim purus, eo quod peccare potest, aliquid potest, large accipiendo potentiam, de potentia absoluta quod non potest de potentia ordinata.
Dico ergo de legislatore, qui est homo purus potens peccare et malum agere, quod de potentia absoluta bene potest statuere vel . privilegiurn concedere ad quod sequitur secundo modo inconveniens predictum. Et hoc ideo quid in antecedente non statim" apparet inconveniens," cuiusmodi, ut puto, est privilegium fratrum secundum eorum intellectum, Et sic dico quod papa de potentia absoluta potest tale privilegium fratribus concedere quia ad ipsum ex natura talis privilegii sive per se non sequeretur dictum inconveniens. Quia non sequeretur si homines in tali statu essent in quali erant ab initio homines primitive ecclesie in qua erant communes sacerdotes. QJ..ti tunc congruebant propter magnam sacerdotum et populi devotionem quando sacerdotes non querebant circa populum que sua erant sed'" quod Ihesu Christi, nee, e converso, populus contra sacerdotem. Sed tunc quando refregescit caritas eorum multorum et habundat iniquitas, tale inconveniens de
